INTRODUCTION
A long line of work emphasizes the correlation between institutions and economic performance (Smith, 1776; Lewis, 1956; North, 1990) . Rich countries have laws that provide incentives to engage in productive economic activity. Investors rely on secure property rights, facilitating investment in human and physical capital; government power is balanced and restricted by an independent judiciary; contracts are enforced effectively, supporting private economic transactions.
Recent research moves from correlation to causation by observing that countries whose colonizers established strong property rights hundreds of years ago have, on average, much higher levels of income today than countries whose colonizers did not (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2001) . Since a country's colonial origin-literally determined centuries ago-can in no meaningful way be said to be caused by its presentday level of income, the nature of countries' colonial origins enables researchers to estimate the causal impact of property rights on long-run economic outcomes. Differences in the legal tradition that countries inherited from their colonial masters also have a long-run impact on economic outcomes. Countries with English common law origins provide investors with stronger protection and are less prone to government ownership and regulation than countries with civil law origins (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1998) . In turn, common law countries have greater fi nancial development, less corruption, smaller informal economies and lower unemployment (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, 2008) .
Case studies seem to suggest that institutions also exert a causal infl uence on economic outcomes over periods of time somewhat shorter than the centuries-long span emphasized by the colonial and legal One particularly striking feature of Figure 1 is the sharp decline in Jamaica's standard of living that sets in after 1972. Of course, the fi rst oil price shock in 1973 precipitated a general slowdown in world economic growth, but the central point (laid out in more detail later in the paper) is that growth in Jamaica slowed more dramatically than it did in Barbados. While Jamaica's economy contracted at a rate of 2.3 percent per year from 1972 to 1987, Barbados, whose economy has a similar structure (see Table 1 ) and was subject to the same external shocks, grew by 1.2 percent per year. In other words, for a 15-year period income per head in Barbados grew by 3.5 percentage points faster than it did in Jamaica. 1 9 6 0 1 9 6 2 1 9 6 4 1 9 6 6 1 9 6 8 1 9 7 0 1 9 7 2 1 9 7 4 1 9 7 6 1 9 7 8 1 9 8 0 1 9 8 2 1 9 8 4 1 9 8 6 1 9 8 8 1 9 9 0 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 8 2 0 "We have put into this constitution a clause which provides that property may not be, in effect, arbitrarily acquired. Property is protected in that it can only be taken under a law which has been passed. And when so taken, it must be taken in accordance with the terms of that law. What the law provides for compensation, you must get. Where the law provides for the interests that must be compensated, you must have a right to resort to court to determine those rights…it is of the highest importance for a country like Jamaica to let the world know that we are a people who honor our bond, and people can come here to invest in this country fully protected by the laws of the land…" (Manley, 1962, p. 306) Barbados, which attained full independence four years after Jamaica, adopted a constitution with an effectively identical coverage of private property. Table   2 ). 
Barbados
Because Jamaica's reversal of fortune coincided with the oil price shock of 1973 and the onset of worldwide stagfl ation, it is tempting to blame the country's downward spiral on external events. While many have done so (see Manley, 1987) , even a cursory comparison with Barbados makes it diffi cult for an objective observer to embrace that conclusion.
The inflation rate in Barbados also spiked in the early 1970s, hitting a peak of 39 percent in 1975, but
Barbados's policy response to the external shocks that precipitated the spike could not have been more different than Jamaica's. First, Barbados avoided nationalization, kept state ownership to a minimum, and adopted an outward-looking growth strategy (Blackman, 2006, page 390 
Exchange rate policy
In 1975 Barbados' superior economic performance (e.g., Seaga, 2006) . But Barbados' fixed exchange rate did not cause its economy to outperform Jamaica's. 1966-1972 1973-1980 1962-1972 1973-1980 Rather, the proximate source of Barbados' superior performance was a set of growth-facilitating policies-monetary restraint, fi scal discipline, openness to trade, and ultimately wage cuts to restore competitive unit labor costs-that had the side effect of enabling the monetary authority to maintain the exchangerate parity without losing external competitiveness.
In contrast, Jamaica's policies were never consistent with maintaining commitment to any parity the government might have wanted to adopt. 
